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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a meeting between a representative of a Louisiana
insurance company and a potential client. The client is interested in
purchasing an automobile liability insurance policy.' Seeking to
save money on her insurance premiums, the client expresses a
desire to waive uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage, which would otherwise automatically be included in the
policy. The representative presents a waiver form issued by the
Louisiana Department of Insurance (LDOI),3 and the two carefully
fill out all of the blanks on the form. After the client signs the
form, she and the representative conclude their remaining business
together, and the satisfied client leaves the office with her new
insurance policy.
Several months later, the client is involved in an automobile
accident with an insolvent and uninsured driver. Unable to recover
damages from the accident by any other means, the client sues her
insurance company, claiming that she is entitled to UM coverage
under her policy. The client's prior waiver of UM coverage is
ineffective, she says, because a blank on the waiver form requiring
the insurer's company name 4 had not been filled out. In its
response, the insurance company notes that a recent Louisiana
Supreme Court case held that the company name is not required
for a valid UM waiver.5 The client counters that the case is not
controlling because it dealt with an old UM waiver form that is no
longer in effect,6 and the instructions accompanying the current
version of the form specifically require inclusion of the company
Copyright 2011, by MICHAEL J. FAGAN, JR.
1. All drivers in Louisiana are required by law to purchase automobile
liability insurance. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:861 (Supp. 2011).
2. Id. § 22:1295(1)(a)(i); see infra Part 11.13.
3. See infra Part 11.13.3.
4. Throughout this Comment, the term "insurer's company name" is used,
rather than the more natural-sounding "insurance company's name," because it
is possible for an insurance company to itself be the insured party in an
insurance policy. Use of the term "insurance company's name" in such a
situation would be ambiguous because both the insurer and the insured would be
insurance companies.
5. Gingles v. Dardenne, 4 So. 3d 799, 800 (La. 2009); see infra Part
II.B.2.a.
6. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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name on the form. The insurance company replies that the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision should be interpreted to apply
to all UM waiver forms issued under the controlling statute, not
just the particular form that was before the court at the time.
The above hypothetical scenario illustrates some of the problems
caused by the recent Louisiana Supreme Court case of Gingles v.
Dardenne, which involved a purported waiver of UM coverage in an
automobile liability insurance policy.9 The central issue in that case
was whether the bulletins of the Commissioner of Insurance
("Commissioner") could impose additional requirements on top of
the pre-existing statutory and jurisprudential requirements for an
effective UM waiver.10 Although the Gingles court found that an
effective UM waiver did not require the insurer's company name,11
the court did not explain its disregard of the Commissioner's
bulletins. Thus, the Gingles decision muddies the waters with
respect to UM waivers while also raising the broader question of
whether, outside the context of UM waivers, documents such as the
bulletins can have legally binding effect under Louisiana law. Is this
issue a mere trifling matter, or does it have broader implications for
administrative law in Louisiana?
This Comment explores the possible ramifications of the
Gingles decision on the requirements that Louisiana state agencies
must follow when promulgating legally binding "rules." The
Comment concludes that most agency documents, which have a
minimal effect on substantive rights, should be generally exempt
from the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (LAPA) in order to
increase administrative efficiency. However, safeguards should be
built into that exemption to account for documents, such as those
in Gingles, that disproportionately impact the substantive rights of
affected persons.12
Part II provides a brief overview of the notice-and-comment
rulemaking provisions of the LAPAl 3 as well as the relevant
legislation and jurisprudence regarding waivers of UM coverage.
Part II culminates in a detailed analysis of the Gingles case and its
7. See infra Part II.B.3.
8. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2011).
9. 4 So. 3d 799.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 800.
12. Whenever this Comment refers to "persons" regulated by an agency, it
is also referring to any legal entities that the agency may also regulate. For the
sake of brevity, the term "persons" will be used to refer to both natural persons
and legal entities.
13. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:950-:972 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
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aftermath. Part III explores the question of whether the types of
documents at issue in Gingles are required under Louisiana law to
go through the LAPA's prescribed rulemaking procedures before
being accorded legally binding effect. Part IV discusses the various
policy considerations behind requiring notice-and-comment
rulemaking for these documents. Part IV also proposes possible
ways to exempt certain agency documents from notice and
comment, both under current Louisiana law and through amending
the LAPA.
II. RULES AND WAIVERS: AN OVERVIEW
To understand the issues that the Gingles decision raises for
administrative rulemaking in Louisiana, it is essential to review the
pertinent provisions of Louisiana administrative law as well as the
relevant Louisiana law regarding waivers of UM coverage. A
careful analysis of the interactions between the two bodies of law
serves to illustrate several problematic issues regarding the scope
of Louisiana's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
A. Louisiana Administrative Rulemaking
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the LAPA in 1966.14 The
legislation was partially based on the Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act as well as the federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).15 The main purpose behind the LAPA's
enactment was to "replace the myriad of rules governing a~ency
procedure with a comprehensive and uniform system." The
legislation covers many facets of state administrative practice,
including adjudication, rulemaking, and the scope of judicial
review of agency action.' 7
1. The LAPA's Rulemaking Procedures
One of the primary components of the LAPA is the enactment
of various procedures that state agencies are required to follow
when promulgating legally binding rules. Section 951(6) of the
14. See Robert Force & Lawrence Griffith, The Louisiana Administrative
Procedure Act, 42 LA. L. REv. 1227, 1227 & n.1 (1982).
15. Id. at 1227 n.1.
16. Karen M. Karrd, Comment, Louisiana's "New" Administrative
Procedure Act, 35 LA. L. REv. 629, 630 (1975); see also Force & Griffith, supra
note 14, at 1227 n.1.
17. See generally Brandee Ketchum & Andrew Olsan, Comment, Louisiana
Administrative Law: A Practitioner's Primer, 68 LA. L. REv. 1313 (2008).
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LAPA defines a "rule," in part, as "each agency statement, guide,
or requirement for conduct or action . . . which has general
applicability and the effect of implementing or interpreting
substantive law or policy, or which prescribes the procedure or
practice requirements of the agency."' 8 Following up on that
definition, Section 951(7) of the LAPA defines "rulemaking" as
"the process employed by an agency for the formulation of a
rule." 9
Section 953 of the LAPA provides detailed procedures that an
agency must follow when engaging in the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of a rule. 20 Generally, the provision requires an agency to
give notice of its intended action at least 90 days before taking
action on the rule.2 1 The agency must publish the notice at least
once in the Louisiana Register and must submit the notice, along
with the full text of the proposed rule, at least 100 days before the
agency takes action on the rule.22 Among other requirements, the
notice must include a statement of the substance of the intended
action as well as various statements of the intended action's
* 23impact. During this notice period, the agency must afford all
"interested persons" a reasonable opportunity to submit data
views, comments, or arguments concerning the proposed action.24
Upon taking the action, the agency must include a response that
addresses any concerns raised by the public submissions. 5
Section 963(C) provides that a court shall invalidate a rule if it
finds that the rule was adopted without "substantial compliance"
with the required rulemaking procedures; 26 similarly, Section
963(E) provides that if a reviewing court finds a rule has not been
promulgated in accordance with the LAPA's provisions, the court
18. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (Supp. 2011).
19. Id. § 951(7).
20. Id. § 953; see Ketchum & Olsan, supra note 17, at 1347-55.
21. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:953(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 2011).
22. Id. § 953(A)(1)(b)(i). The Louisiana Register is published at least once a
month by the Department of the State Register and contains, among other things,
the text of all proposed rules filed during the preceding month as well as any
associated notices. Id. § 954.1(B) (2003).
23. Id. § 953(A)(1)(a)(i-(viii) (Supp. 2011).
24. Id. § 953(A)(2)(a). The LAPA provides that a "person" is "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or
public or private organization of any character other than an agency." Id. §
951(5). An "interested person" would presumably be any "person," as defined
by the LAPA, that wishes to provide input on the proposed action.
25. Id. § 953(A)(2)(b)(ii).
26. Id. § 963(C) (2003).
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must declare the measure invalid and unenforceable. 27
Furthermore, any proposed rule is subject to approval by an
oversight subcommittee of the state legislature 28 and may also be
invalidated by a concurrent resolution of the legislature 2 9 or by an
executive order of the governor.30
In summary, the LAPA requires an agency that wishes to
promulgate a rule to provide prior "notice" of the proposed rule to
the public and an opportunity for the public to submit "comments"
on the rule prior to it becoming enforceable law. According to one
court, the primary purpose behind these so-called "notice-and-
comment" procedures is to ensure that all interested parties are
made aware of any proposed rule that may be adopted.3 1 The
procedures also give those parties an opportunity, prior to the rule
going into effect, to articulate any concerns that the rule may raise,
so that the agency might address those concerns before the final
rule is promulgated.32
2. The Scope of a "Rule"
Although Louisiana jurisprudence regarding precisely what
constitutes a rule within the meaning of Section 951(6) is not
extensive, one Louisiana First Circuit case is instructive on the
matter. Star Enterprise v. State involved a letter that the
Department of Revenue and Taxation sent to various oil
27. Id. § 963(E). The provision contemplates a rule as being a "statement,
guide, requirement, circular, directive, explanation, interpretation, guideline, or
similar measure." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible that the drafters of
the provision expressly accounted for publications such as the Commissioner's
bulletins. See infra Part III.B; see also ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 74-75 (1986) ("Experience has shown an
inclination 'by some agencies to label as "bulletins," "announcements,"
"guides," "interpretive bulletins," and the like, announcements which, in legal
operation and effect, really amount to rules.' The word 'statement' . . . makes it
clear that all such agency pronouncements are included within the definition of
'rule,' even if they are called manuals, memos, guidelines, or otherwise."
(quoting I FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 108 (1965))).
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:968(G) (Supp. 2011).
29. Id. § 969 (2003).
30. Id. § 970.
31. Dorignac v. La. State Racing Comm'n, 436 So. 2d 667, 669 (La. Ct.
App. 4th 1983).
32. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 402 ("Public participation promotes fundamental
democratic values by enhancing the responsiveness of agencies to the interest
groups affected by regulation. . . . In short, through advance notice and
comment, every constituency has an opportunity to participate in a meaningful
manner in making the laws that will affect it.").
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refineries.33 The letter announced a new method of taxation on the
use of certain industrial chemicals, contravening the method
previously set forth by statute and an agency memorandum. 34 The
defendant oil companies argued that the letter was a rule under the
LAPA and was thus invalid because it did not go through notice
and comment, 35 while the Department argued that the letter was
merely a "clarification" of the proper taxation method of use of the
chemicals and thus should be exempt from notice and comment. 36
Siding with the defendants, the court held that the letter constituted
a rule under the LAPA because the letter: (1) directed affected
taxpayers to disregard the Department's previous rules; (2) was of
general applicability to all manufacturers of the chemicals at issue;
(3) effectuated an interpretation of substantive law; and (4)
resulted in the implementation of substantive law.3 7 Because the
letter had not been promulgated in accordance with the LAPA's
required notice-and-comment procedures, the court held that the
rule was invalid and unenforceable. 3 8
Besides Star Enterprise, several other appellate court and
Louisiana Attorney General opinions have addressed the issue of
what constitutes a rule under the LAPA. These opinions have
variously held that agency bulletins,39 advisory opinions, 40
statements of policy,41 rate-setting methodologies, 4 2 guidelines and
guidance documents,4 3 and correctional facility regulations4 are
rules subject to the LAPA's notice-and-comment requirements.
Many of the cases that fail to recognize the existence of a rule
involve the internal procedures of universities, such as faculty
tenure procedures and faculty grievance procedures.45
33. 676 So. 2d 827 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1996).
34. Id. at 830.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 832.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. La. Ins. Rating Comm'n, 696 So. 2d 1021 (La.
Ct. App. 1st 1997); see infra Part III.B.2.
40. Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 99-130 (1999).
41. Spine Diagnostics Ctr. of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. La. State Bd. of Nursing,
No. 2006 CW 0554, 2006 WL 3804630 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 28, 2006).
42. Women's & Children's Hosp. v. State, 984 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2008), affd, 2 So. 3d 397 (La. 2009).
43. Bower v. Schumpert Med. Ctr., 618 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1993);
Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 93-662 (1994).
44. Hills v. Cain, 764 So. 2d 1048 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2000); Rivera v. State,
727 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1998).
45. Johnson v. S. Univ. & A&M Coll., 803 So. 2d 1140 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2001); Jones v. S. Univ. & A&M Coll. Sys., 693 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1997); Mix v. Univ. of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992);
13 10 [Vol. 71
Among the opinions that recognize the existence of a rule, the
common thread appears to be that the rule has the effect of
implementing or interpreting substantive agency policy above and
beyond previously existing statutory and administrative
requirements.4 6 Furthermore, the rules are invariably of general
applicability to those persons that could potentially be affected by
the rule.47 To date, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not issued an
opinion providing an authoritative interpretation of the LAPA's
definition of a "rule," so the lower state courts will likely continue
to adjudicate the precise boundaries of that definition.
B. UM Waiver Law
Considered alone, the issue of what constitutes a rule under the
LAPA may seem primarily academic in nature, without significant
real-world relevance beyond isolated issues regarding individual
agency actions. However, the resolution of this question could
potentially have broad ramifications for Louisiana residents, given
the increasingly pervasive powers that state administrative
agencies exert over many aspects of state government. Perhaps
Grace v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., 442 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1983). These cases relied on the LAPA provision that exempts from the
definition of a rule those agency statements, guides, or requirements for conduct
or action that "regulat[e] only the internal management of the agency." LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (Supp. 2011); see infra Part IV.B.2.
46. See, e.g., Women's & Children's Hosp., 984 So. 2d at 771 (holding that
an agency "rate-setting methodology" had the substantive effect of establishing
rights and obligations regarding Medicaid reimbursement payments); Spine
Diagnostics, 2006 WL 3804630 at *8 (holding that an agency "statement"
expanded the scope of practice for nurse anesthetists into an area where they had
not traditionally practiced); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. La. Ins. Rating Comm'n,
696 So. 2d 1021, 1026-27 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1997) (holding that an agency
bulletin interpreted the agency's substantive policy regarding the use of "wrap-
up" insurance policies in Louisiana); Star Enter. v. State, 676 So. 2d 827, 832
(La. Ct. App. 1st 1996) (holding that an agency letter contained the agency's
interpretation of a substantive law and implemented the substantive use tax law).
47. See, e.g., Spine Diagnostics, 2006 WL 3804630 at *8 (holding that an
agency "statement" was capable of being applied to every nurse anesthetist with
the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the procedures at issue);
Liberty Mut., 696 So. 2d at 1026 (holding that an agency bulletin had general
applicability to all insurers that issued "wrap-up" insurance policies in
Louisiana); Star Enter., 676 So. 2d at 832 (holding that an agency letter was of
general applicability to all manufacturers of certain industrial chemicals).
48. A Louisiana government website lists 131 different state agencies.
Agency Index, LOUISIANA.Gov, http://www.louisiana.gov/Government/Agency




one of the most prominent examples of an area of Louisiana law
where important policy considerations hinge on the precise
definition of a rule under the LAPA is the area of insurance law
dealing with UM coverage provided by automobile liability
insurers.
1. UMLegislation and Pre-Gingles Jurisprudence
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:1295 details various
provisions governing the issuance of UM coverage in Louisiana. 49
The object of the UM statute is to promote recovery of damages
for innocent victims of automobile accidents by making insurance
coverage available for their benefit when the tortfeasor is without
insurance or is inadequately insured.50 This statute embodies a
strong public policy of the state. In fact, the state public policy in
favor of UM coverage is so strong that a valid rejection of UM
coverage must meet the formal requirements of law, no matter how
clearly the insured expresses a desire to waive coverage.52 Because
of this strong public policy, UM coverage is implied in any
automobile liability policy; even if the policy does not expressly
provide for UM coverage, a court will nevertheless implicitly read
the coverage into the policy unless such coverage is validly
rejected under the law.53
Since 1998, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
22:1295(l)(a)(ii) has delineated the sole method in Louisiana by
which a person can waive UM coverage in an automobile liability
insurance policy.54 The provision states, in pertinent part:
Such rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of
economic-only coverage shall be made only on a form
prescribed by the [C]ommissioner of [I]nsurance. The
prescribed form shall be provided by the insurer and signed
by the named insured or his legal representative. The form
signed by the named insured or his legal representative
which initially rejects such coverage, selects lower limits,
or selects economic-only coverage shall be conclusively
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295 (Supp. 2011). The UM statute has
changed designations multiple times, and cases addressing the statute will
reference it by its designation at the time the case was decided.
50. Roger v. Estate of Moulton, 513 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (La. 1987).
5 1. Id.
52. Id. at 1131.
53. Id.
54. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2011).
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presumed to become a part of the policy or contract when
issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically
attached thereto. A properly completed and signed form
creates a rebuttable presumption that the insured knowingly
rejected coverage, selected a lower limit, or selected
economic-only coverage.
The form prescribed by the Commissioner is the only form that
may be used to waive UM coverae; use of any other form renders
the waiver automatically invalid. From 1998 to 2008, the only
form that insurers were allowed to use for UM waivers was one
promulgated by the (now defunct) Louisiana Insurance Rating
Commission (LIRC) within several of its informational bulletins.
That form provides several options: (1) selection of UM coverage
at or below the limits of the normal bodily injury liability
coverage; (2) selection of "economic-only" UM coverage at or
below the limits of the normal bodily iniury liability coverage; or
(3) a waiver of UM coverage altogether. The form also includes a
blank for the printed name and signature of the insured (or the
insured's legal representative), a blank for the policy number, and
a blank for the date.59 In addition to containing the form itself, the
55. Id.
56. See Gautreaux v. Dufrene, 894 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2005)
(invalidating a UM waiver because the form did not meet the Commissioner's
requirements); Richardson v. Lott, 868 So. 2d 64, 73 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2003)
(holding that UM waivers executed after September 6, 1998 were invalid
because the Commissioner's form was not used); Stewart v. Edwards, 784 So.
2d 740, 744 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2001) (stating that the legislature has mandated
a required UM form for use by insurers).
57. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01 (1998); La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03 (1998); La.
Bulletin LIRC 01-05 Amended (2006). The LDOI periodically releases bulletins
to provide guidance to both insurers and insureds in Louisiana. Back when the
LIRC existed, it also published bulletins of the same type. In 2007, the
Louisiana Legislature disbanded the LIRC and transferred its powers, duties,
and functions to the LDOI and the Commissioner. Act No. 459, 2007 La. Acts
2487. In 2008, the LDOI promulgated a new UM waiver form that has now
replaced the form issued by the LIRC in 1998. See infra Part II.B.3. The
introductory section of Bulletin 98-03 expressly states that "[t]his Bulletin is not
a directive, regulation, or rule." La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03. It thus appears that the
LIRC may have anticipated the argument that its bulletins are "rules" subject to
notice and comment under the LAPA and made the disclaimer in an attempt to
evade the LAPA's notice-and-comment requirements.
58. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01; La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03; La. Bulletin LIRC
01-05 Amended. "Economic losses" are payments to reimburse an injured
person for documented dollar loss due to an accident. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03.
"Noneconomic losses" are losses other than economic loss, including, for
example, pain, suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish. Id.




LIRC bulletins also provide accompanying instructions that
purport to impose an additional requirement for validly completing
the form-that the insurer's company name be included in the
lower left-hand corner of the form. 60 Although the bulletins say
that the company name is required on the form, the form itself does
not provide a blank for writing in the company name.6 1 There is
thus an apparent conflict between the form itself and its
accompanying bulletins.
The issue of what exactly is required to validly waive UM
coverage came before the Louisiana Supreme Court in Duncan v.
U.S.A.A. Insurance Co. 62 That case involved a UM waiver form
where the insurer had not filled in the blank for the policy
number.63 Rejecting the defendant's argument that the only
requirements for validly waiving UM coverage should be those
explicitly listed in the UM statute, the court instead held that a
valid waiver of UM coverage requires six tasks:
The insured initials the selection or rejection chosen to
indicate that the decision was made by the insured. If lower
limits are selected, then the lower limits are entered on the
form to denote the exact limits. The insured or the legal
representative signs the form evidencing the intent to waive
UM coverage and includes his or her printed name to
identify the signature. Moreover, the insured dates the form
to determine the effective date of the UM waiver. Likewise,
the form includes the policy number to demonstrate which
policy it refers to. Thus, the policy number is relevant to
the determination of whether the insured waived UM
coverage for the particular policy at issue.
60. Bulletin 98-01 initially imposed the "requirements" for including the
company name and policy number. Bulletin 98-03 qualified the policy number
requirement by saying that the policy number "should" be shown at the lower
right-hand corner of the form (implying that its inclusion might not be
mandatory), and in the case where a policy number is not available, the space for
the policy number may be left blank or a binder number may be inserted. An
updated version of the form, promulgated in 2006 as part of Bulletin 01-05
Amended, includes a second blank for the date (next to the blank for the printed
name of the insured) but does not include a blank for the policy number. This
revision supports the idea that the Commissioner considered the policy number
to be optional, rather than required.
61. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01; La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03; La. Bulletin LIRC
01-05 Amended.
62. 950 So. 2d 544 (La. 2006).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 552.
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Because the form did not include the policy number, the court
concluded that the insured had not effectively waived UM
coverage and therefore was entitled to UM coverage with limits
equal to the regular liability limits of the policy.6 5 The court did
not indicate whether it relied on the Commissioner's bulletins in
determining the requirements for an effective UM waiver or if it
rather had some independent basis for deducing those
requirements.
Several subsequent Louisiana Supreme Court cases have
qualified the Duncan court's original holding. In Carter v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court, apparently
relying on "the Commissioner of Insurance's regulations," held
that the policy number is not required for a valid UM waiver if the
number does not exist at the time the form is completed.66 The
court affirmed its Carter holding in Gray v. American National
Property & Casualty Co. 67 Additionally, the Gray court held that
the tasks prescribed in Duncan (as qualified by Carter) for a valid
UM waiver must all be completed before the waiver form is signed
by the insured, such that the signature represents an agreement
with all of the information contained on the form. 68
In summary, a valid waiver of UM coverage requires six tasks:
(1) the insured must initial the selection or rejection of coverage;
(2) if lower limits of coverage are selected, the insured must enter
the exact amount of coverage desired; (3) the insured must sign the
form; (4) the insured must print his or her name on the form; (5)
the insured must date the form; and (6) the insured must include
the insurance policy number.6 9 If the policy number does not exist
at the time the insured fills out the waiver form, then it does not
need to be included. 70 Before signing the form, the insured must
first complete the other required tasks for a UM waiver. 7 1 A
question has arisen, however, as to whether these requirements are
exclusive or whether a valid waiver of UM coverage also requires
65. Id. at 554.
66. 964 So. 2d 375 (La. 2007). By "regulations," the court was presumably
referring to the Commissioner's bulletins. See infra notes 111-13 and
accompanying text (Carter discussion).
67. 977 So. 2d 839, 847 n.2 (La. 2008).
68. Id. at 849. Of course, because the signing of the form is itself one of the
tasks prescribed in Duncan, Gray only requires that the other tasks prescribed in
Duncan, besides the signing, must be completed before the insured or the
insured's legal representative signs the form.
69. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 950 So. 2d 544, 552-54 (La. 2006).
70. Carter, 964 So. 2d at 376.
71. Gray, 977 So. 2d at 849.
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something more-namely, the inclusion of the insurer's company
name on the form.
2. The "Company Name" Requirement for UM Waivers
The state appellate courts have addressed, with varying results,
the conflict between the Commissioner's bulletins, which require
that the insurer's company name be included on the UM waiver
form, and the Duncan decision, which does not list the inclusion of
the company name as a requirement for a valid UM waiver. In
Cohn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Louisiana First Circuit heard a case involving a UM waiver form
that included neither the insurer's company name nor the complete
policy number and that did not indicate whether the signatory was
signing in her personal capacity or in a representative capacity.7 2
Because the waiver of UM coverage was not "clear and
unmistakable," the court held that the executed form did not
constitute a valid waiver of UM coverage.73 The court did not
make clear, however, which defect in the form invalidated the
coverage; it merely stated that the various defects, taken together,
resulted in the waiver not being "clear and unmistakable." 74
By contrast, in Fescharek v. USAgencies Insurance Co., the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit considered a case involving a UM waiver
form that did not include the insurer's company name but instead
included an acronym and a bar code.7 5 The court commented that,
despite the missing compan 6name, there was nevertheless a "clear
rejection of UM coverage."6 Accordingly, the court held that the
waiver of UM coverage was valid, notwithstanding the absent
company name. The court noted that the acronym "clearly
refer[red]" to the insurer;78 however, it is unclear whether the court
viewed the acronym as an effective substitution for the required
company name or whether the acronym merely served as evidence
of the "clear rejection" of UM coverage.
72. 895 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2005).
73. Id. at 602-03.
74. Id.
75. 979 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2008).





a. The Gingles Decision
The Louisiana Third Circuit addressed the company name issue
in Gingles v. Dardenne.7 9 The plaintiff in that case, Carla Ann
Gingles, was involved in an automobile accident while operating a
vehicle that was owned by her employer Novartis Corp., and
insured by Ace American Insurance Co.8 o Gingles sued Ace
American, claiming that Ace American had provided her with UM
coverage through Novartis and that the UM waiver form that
Novartis had previously executed was invalid because it did not
include the insurer's company name.8' The trial court granted
summary judgment to Ace American, and Gingles appealed to the
Louisiana Third Circuit.82
The third circuit reversed the trial court and granted summary
judgment to Gingles, holding that the failure to include the
company name on the form rendered the waiver of UM coverage
ineffective.8 3 Regarding Louisiana Bulletin LIRC 98-01, the court
remarked that, because the Commissioner had issued the form and
the bulletin together, the Commissioner must have intended the
documents to be considered together and that "[a]n insurance
company can no more reject the form's instructions than it can
reject the prescribed form in favor of its own creation." 84 Noting
that the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Duncan that inclusion of
the policy number is a requirement for a valid UM waiver, 8 the
court opined that if the absence of the policy number is enough to
invalidate a UM waiver, then the omission of the company name
should have the same effect. 86
Ace American appealed the third circuit's decision to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.8 7 In a per curiam opinion, the court
reversed the third circuit, holding that UM coverage had been
validly waived, despite the lack of the insurer's company name on
the form.88 Mentioning that it had previously enumerated in
Duncan the six requirements for filling out a valid UM waiver
form, the court held that, because Novartis had met all of these
requirements, the UM waiver was effective-notwithstanding the
79. 998 So. 2d 795 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008), rev'd, 4 So. 3d 799 (La. 2009).
80. Id. at 796.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 800.
84. Id. at 798.
85. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
86. Gingles, 998 So. 2d at 799.
87. Gingles v. Dardenne, 4 So. 3d 799, 799 (La. 2009).
88. Id. at 800.
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omission from the form of the insurer's company name.89
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any discussion of the
Commissioner's bulletins. It is thus unclear whether the Gingles
court held that all such bulletins should be generally disregarded or
whether the court merely invalidated that particular bulletin's
requirement in light of Duncan.
b. Post-Gingles Jurisprudence
Since the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down Gingles, a
number of state and federal courts have cited the decision as
binding precedent for the proposition that a valid waiver of UM
coverage does not require the insurer's company name on the
waiver form. 90 The Louisiana Supreme Court itself commented in
a subsequent case that Gingles allowed a UM waiver to be valid
without the insurer's company name on the form, despite the
form's failure to comply with the Commissioner's bulletins.9 1
However, some courts and jurists, while acknowledging the
binding nature of the Gingles decision, have nevertheless disagreed
with the Gingles court's reasoning. In Flores v. Doe, for example,
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit expressed its disapproval of the Gingles
decision, commenting that the Louisiana Supreme Court had relied
on the Commissioner's regulations in Carter but had disregarded
those same regulations in Gingles.92
3. New UM Waiver Form
In 2008, the Commissioner issued a bulletin that included a
new UM waiver form, which differs significantly from the form at
issue in Gingles. Before January 1, 2010, insurance companies
had the option of utilizing either the "old" UM waiver form,
originally issued in Louisiana Bulletin LIRC 98-01 and considered
89. Id. at 799-800.
90. See Floyd v. Canal Indem. Co., No. 07-1393, 2009 WL 815983 (W.D.
La. Mar. 24, 2009); Bianchini v. Moran, No. 2010-CA-0817, 2010 La. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 681 at *7 (La. Ct. App. 4th Nov. 24, 2010); Guillory v.
Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 47 So. 3d 12, 16-17 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2010); Alvarez
v. LeBlanc, 31 So. 3d 1120 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2010); Keen v. Ashley, 21 So. 3d
987 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2009); Ashmore v. McBride, 11 So. 3d 720 (La. Ct. App.
3d 2009); Wart v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 7 So. 3d 865, 869 n.4 (La. Ct. App.
2d 2009).
91. Lynch v. Kennard, 12 So. 3d 944, 945 n.4 (La. 2009).
92. 19 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009); see also Dixon v. Direct
Gen. Ins. Co. of La., 12 So. 3d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2009). For a discussion of
the Dixon case, see infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
93. La. LDOI Bulletin No. 08-02 (2008).
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in Duncan and Gingles, or the "new" form issued in LDOI Bulletin
No. 08-02,94 but now the "new" form is the exclusive instrument
by which an insured can waive UM coverage. 9 5 This "new" form,
together with its accompanying bulletin, requires the inclusion of
the insurer's company name on the form but provides that the
insurance policy number is merely optional.96
The "new" UM waiver form's requirements directly contradict
the Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions in Duncan and Gingles,
which together held that the policy number is required for a valid
UM waiver but that the company name is not required. 97 It is
unclear whether the court's decisions were meant to apply just to
the "old" UM waiver form or whether they apply to any form
promulgated under the UM statute. If the Duncan and Gingles
holdings apply to all forms prescribed under the statute, then the
Commissioner has contradicted the Louisiana Supreme Court's
pronouncements by issuing a form that conflicts with Duncan and
Gingles. The issue of the legally binding nature of the bulletins, as
well as the forms themselves, thus takes on an even greater
importance.
III. ARE THE DOCUMENTS LEGALLY BINDING?
The case law regarding UM waivers illustrates the question of
the legally binding nature of the Commissioner's bulletins.
Another question that the UM waiver cases do not address, but
which may become relevant with the issuance of the new UM
waiver form, is the legally binding nature of the form itself. The
Commissioner did not promulgate either the "old" or the "new"
UM waiver forms-or the forms' accompanying bulletins-via the
notice-and-comment procedures prescribed by the LAPA.98 If
either the forms or the bulletins meet the LAPA's definition of a
legally binding "rule," then under the LAPA, absent some sort of
exception, the documents must go through notice and comment
before becoming legally binding.99 Hence, because neither the
"new" UM waiver form nor its accompanying bulletin went
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (Duncan discussion);
supra Part II.B.2.a (Gingles discussion).
98. The LDOI publishes its bulletins (which include the forms) on its
website, but generally does not publish those bulletins in the Louisiana Register.
LA. DEP'T INS., http://www.ldi.state.1a.us/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
99. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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through notice and comment, the legality of the documents hinges
on whether those documents are rules under the LAPA.
A. Legality of the UM Waiver Form
The threshold issue when analyzing whether the
Commissioner's form is legally binding is whether the form itself
constitutes a rule under the LAPA. Revisiting the LAPA's
statutory definition, a "rule" includes "each agency statement,
guide, or requirement for conduct or action ... which has general
applicability and the effect of implementing or interpreting
substantive law or policy."100 The Commissioner's UM waiver
form could arguably be viewed as a "requirement for conduct or
action" because it is currently the only instrument under Louisiana
law by which one may waive UM coverage in an automobile
liability insurance policy.10' For the same reason, the form is
certainly of "general applicability" to all insured persons seeking
to effectuate such a waiver.
As to the question of whether the form "implement[s] or
interpret[s] substantive law or policy," it is worth noting that the
statute authorizing the promulgation of the form only lists a few
requirements for a valid UM waiver.102 Those requirements are: (1)
the form must be provided by the insurer; (2) the form must be
signed by the insured or his legal representative; and (3) the
insured must either reject UM coverage entirely, select lower limits
for UM coverage, or select economic-only UM coverage.' The
form itself, however, imposes several additional requirements not
listed in the statute, including: (1) writing one's initials next to the
selection of coverage; (2) indicating the lower limits of coverage
(if such limits are selected); (3) printing the insured's name on the
form; (4) dating the form; and (5) indicating the policy number (if
it exists at the time).104 By imposing additional requirements for a
valid UM waiver on top of those prescribed by statute, the form
arguably "implements substantive law." If the form comports with
the LAPA's definition of a rule, then it follows that unless some
sort of exception applies, the form must go through the LAPA's
prescribed notice-and-comment procedures before it can become
legally binding.
100. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 22:1295(1)(a)(ii).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01 (1998); La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03 (1998); La.
Bulletin LIRC 01-05 Amended (2006); see supra notes 54-61 and
accompanying text.
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Even if the UM waiver form, specifically, is a rule under the
LAPA, the question then becomes whether all agency forms might
also be classified as rules subject to notice-and-comment. The
definition of a "rule" under the LAPA is exceptionally broad, and
the definition could conceivably cover even "mundane" forms that
have minimal or no impact on the substantive rights of affected
persons. 0 5 The policy decision of whether to require notice and
comment for agency forms involves competing interests: the
administrative efficiency gained by exempting the forms from
notice and comment versus the protection afforded to potentially
affected parties by requiring the forms to go through notice and
comment.10 6 Subjecting all forms to onerous notice and comment
requirements could potentially paralyze state agencies; at the same
time, exempting all forms from notice and comment could allow
forms with a measurable effect on substantive rights, such as the
UM waiver form, to become legally binding without prior public
input. Because the Louisiana Legislature has not yet made this
policy judgment, and because no Louisiana court has ruled on the
105. Agencies issue innumerable forms for a variety of purposes, most of
which do not involve substantive rights to the degree of the UM waiver form.
Data collection is one of the most common purposes for which an agency will
issue a form. See, e.g., Complaint Report Form, LA. DEP'T INS., http://www.
Idi.state.1a.us/consumers/generalcomplaintform.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
106. States that have addressed this issue have reached differing conclusions.
For example, Alaska has specifically exempted forms from its statutory
definition of a "regulation" (the rough equivalent of a "rule" in Louisiana).
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.640(a)(3) (2007). Michigan and New York both exclude
from a "rule" all forms and instructions that do not have legal effect but are
merely explanatory. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.207(h) (West 2004); N.Y.
A.P.A. § 102(2)(b)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2011). California law generally
exempts agency forms, as well as their accompanying instructions, from being
"regulations" unless the contents of a form or instruction exceed existing legal
requirements. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(c) (West 2005); see In re Request
for Regulatory Determination, 94 Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 61, 105 (Jan. 14,
1994), available at http://www.oal.ca.gov/res/docs/pdf/determinations/2000_
and Prior/1993 OALDeterminationNo._5.pdf, at 266. Florida's definition of
a "rule" includes "any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any
information not specifically required by statute or an existing rule." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 120.52(16) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Spec. Sess.). Any Florida
agency form that meets this definition must be incorporated by reference into a
corresponding rule. Id. § 120.55(l)(a). The most recent Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act excludes from its definition of a "rule" any
"forms developed by an agency to implement or interpret agency law or policy."
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 102(30)(E) (2010),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/msapa/2010_final.pdf.
See infra Part IV.A (discussing various policy considerations both for and
against requiring notice and comment for agency forms).
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issue of whether agency forms constitute rules under the LAPA,
the legal status of these forms is currently unclear.
B. Legality of the Bulletins
Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that the UM waiver form
is a rule subject to notice and comment under the LAPA, the
question then becomes whether the bulletins accompanying the
UM waiver form are also rules subject to notice and comment.
Much of the same definitional analysis that applies to the form also
applies to the bulletins; an informational bulletin could be viewed
as a "requirement for conduct or action" of "general applicability"
and having the effect of "implementing or interpreting substantive
law or policy."10 7 If the information in the bulletins merely
mirrored the contents of the form itself, without imposing any
additional substantive requirements, perhaps the bulletins would
not implement substantive law or policy.'O However, because the
bulletins impose the additional requirement of including the
insurer's company name on the form, it is likely that the bulletins
do, in fact, implement substantive law regarding UM waivers. The
definitional analysis thus indicates that the bulletins should have to
go through notice and comment before being accorded legally
binding effect. Despite this, the Louisiana jurisprudence has
stopped short of making such a declaration.
1. The Louisiana Supreme Court's Stance
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Gingles, taken at
face value, indicates that the court does not accord legally binding
effect to the Commissioner's bulletins accompanying the UM
waiver form. After all, the Gingles court held that the form in
question, which did not include the insurer's company name,
constituted a valid waiver of UM coverage, despite the requirement
of the Commissioner's bulletins that the company name be
included on the form.109 However, the Gingles court did not
provide a justification for ignoring the Commissioner's bulletins,
beyond citing Duncan as precedent."l0 Furthermore, the Louisiana
Supreme Court may have espoused a contrary view in past
107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (Supp. 2011).
108. Of course, describing the plain requirements for filling out the UM
waiver form could still be seen as interpreting substantive law or policy, which
would make the bulletins fall under the LAPA's definition of a rule anyway. Id.




opinions regarding the legally binding effect of documents such as
the bulletins, thus leaving unclear the precise scope of the Gingles
holding.
In Carter, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a valid UM
waiver form does not require the inclusion of a policy number if
the number does not exist at the time the form is completed.'1 In
so holding, the court noted that "the Commissioner's regulations
specifically allow omission of the policy number if it does not exist
at the time the UM waiver form is completed."ll 2 Presumably, the
"regulations" referred to by the Carter court were the
Commissioner's bulletins; the court therefore, at the very least,
conferred some deference to those bulletins. Given the extremely
short length of the opinion,113 however, it is difficult to determine
whether the Carter court actually accorded legally binding effect
to the bulletins or whether the court merely relied on the bulletins
as persuasive authority to support an independent, albeit unspoken,
basis for judgment.
Although the Carter decision is not clear as to whether the
Louisiana Supreme Court regarded the Commissioner's bulletins
as legally binding, at least one circuit court judge believes that the
Louisiana Supreme Court has, in the past, espoused such a view. In
Dixon v. Direct General Insurance Co. ofLouisiana, a case handed
down after the Louisiana Supreme Court's Gingles decision, the
Louisiana First Circuit relied on Gingles as binding precedent in
holding that a UM waiver form that did not include the insurer's
company name nevertheless constituted a valid waiver of UM
coverage.114 Judge Gaidry, writing separately, noted his
displeasure with the Gingles court's rationale."' Pointing out the
factual similarities between Gingles and Duncan, Judge Gaidry
argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court had relied upon the
Commissioner's regulations in Duncan but had disregarded those
same regulations in Gingles.116 Judge Gaidry's reasoning appears
to be that, because the UM statute does not state a requirement for
including the policy number on the form, the Duncan court must
have relied on the Commissioner's bulletin when announcing that
requirement. However, this is not necessarily the case; the UM
form involved in Duncan, which was promulgated along with
Louisiana Bulletin LIRC 98-01, clearly and expressly includes a
111. Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 964 So. 2d 375, 376 (La.
2007); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
112. Carter, 964 So. 2d at 376.
113. A writ opinion, the Carter decision is only three sentences in length. Id.
114. 12 So. 3d 357, 362-63 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2009).
115. Id. at 363 (Gaidry, J., concurring).
116. Id.
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blank for the policy number." 7 The Duncan court thus could have
conceivably extrapolated the policy number requirement from a
visual examination of the form itself, rather than from the
Commissioner's accompanying bulletins.
Although it is unclear whether the majority in Duncan viewed
the Commissioner's bulletins as legally binding, a dissenting
justice in Duncan seems to have at least accorded these bulletins
substantial deference. Justice Weimer, in his dissent from a denial
of rehearing in Duncan, cited Louisiana Bulletin LIRC 98-03 for
the proposition that the policy number is merely an optional
inclusion on the UM waiver form for identification purposes,
rather than a requirement." 8 Comparing Bulletin LIRC 98-03 to
Bulletin LIRC 98-01, Justice Weimer remarked that the instruction
for inserting the policy number had been changed from "must be
placed" to "should be shown" and that the newer bulletin advised
insurers that "the space for the policy number may be left blank"
when the policy number is not available.' 19 Concluding his dissent,
Justice Weimer argued that the court should "consider" the
Commissioner's instructions regarding the Commissioner's own
form because insurers are entitled to rely on those instructions.120
At least one Louisiana Supreme Court justice has thus accorded
substantial deference to the Commissioner's bulletins and may
have even expressed a preference for conferring upon them legally
binding effect.
2. Comparing Gingles to Liberty Mutual
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not directly ruled
on whether the Commissioner's bulletins are rules subject to notice
and comment under the LAPA, the Louisiana First Circuit has
addressed a similar situation, perhaps shedding some light on the
Gingles court's reasoning. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission, the court considered a
bulletin issued by the LIRC-the same agency that published the
Gingles bulletins-that provided a definition of "wrap-up"
insurance policies and required insurers to obtain approval from
the Commission before such policies could be issued.121 The
117. La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01 (1998). A later revision of the form removed
the blank for the policy number and replaced it with another blank for the date.
La. Bulletin LIRC 01-05 Amended (2006); see supra note 60.
118. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 950 So. 2d 544, 556 (La. 2006) (Weimer,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 696 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1997).
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Commission argued that the bulletin was merely an "investigatory
order" or an "interpretive directive" and therefore was not a rule
because it did not impose obligations not already required by
existing law.'22
Rejecting this argument, the first circuit held that the bulletin
constituted a rule under the LAPA.123 According to the court, the
bulletin was a rule because it had general applicability to all
insurers issuing that specific type of insurance in Louisiana and
because the bulletin had the effect of interpreting the
Commission's substantive poliev regarding the use of wrap-up
insurance policies in the state. In its original opinion, the court
did not address the issue of whether the rule was invalid; however,
on a subsequent denial of rehearing, the court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the rule was invalid because it did not Mthrough the LAPA's prescribed notice-and-comment procedures.
The initial concern one confronts when evaluating Liberty
Mutual vis-d-vis Gingles is whether the two cases are similar
enough to make the reasoning in Liberty Mutual applicable to the
Gingles decision. At first glance, the bulletins in Gingles seem to
be far less substantive in nature than the bulletin in Liberty Mutual,
despite the fact that the same agency issued the bulletins involved
in each of the cases. After all, the only additional requirement that
the Gingles bulletins impose is the inclusion of the insurer's
company name on the UM waiver form,' 26 which, in the abstract,
hardly seems significant compared to the far-reaching effects of
the Liberty Mutual bulletin.127 But the Gingles bulletins' additional
requirement does, in fact, have major ramifications, as evidenced
by the multitude of cases involving the validity of UM waivers
where the insurer's company name is missing from the form.128
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are therefore similar
enough to warrant an analysis of the Liberty Mutual court's
reasoning as it relates to the Gingles decision.
122. Id at 1025.
123. Id at 1026-27.
124. Id
125. Id. at 1031.
126. In fact, it is arguable that the bulletins also remove a requirement,
because the bulletins' wording, taken together, suggests that the policy number
is merely for identification purposes and is not required. See supra notes 118-20
and accompanying text. This viewpoint is supported by the Commissioner's
latest revision of the form. See supra Part II.B.3. However, the viewpoint is
contradicted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Duncan. See supra notes 62-65
and accompanying text.
127. Liberty Mut., 696 So. 2d at 1023 (requiring insurers to submit their
"wrap-up" insurance policies to the agency for pre-approval).
128. See supra Part II.B.2.
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The Liberty Mutual court held that the bulletin regarding wrap-
up insurance policies constituted a rule under the LAPA in part
because the bulletin was of "general applicability" to insurers
seeking to issue those types of policies.' Similarly, the bulletins
in Gingles were of general applicability, both to insureds seeking
to waive UM coverage and to insurers providing the automobile
liability policies.130 The Liberty Mutual court also held that the
bulletin in that case was a rule because it interpreted the agency's
substantive policy regarding the use of the wrap-up insurance
policies.131 Following that reasoning, the Gingles bulletins
arguably also "interpreted" the agency's substantive policy
regarding the requirements for an effective UM waiver by
delineating those requirements. Thus, it would seem that under
either branch of analysis, the reasoning propounded by the first
circuit in Liberty Mutual to classify the bulletin in that case as a
rule under the LAPA would also, when applied to the facts in
Gingles, establish the Gingles bulletin as a rule subject to notice
and comment.
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court did not provide a
sufficient explanation for its holding in Gingles, state agencies
have been left in the dark about whether, or under what
circumstances, notice and comment is required for their
informational bulletins. If, in a subsequent case, the court adopted
the reasoning of Liberty Mutual to explain its Gingles decision,
then agencies would have a clearer picture regarding when they
must subject their bulletins or similar documents to the notice-and-
comment process. An agency would be able to match its bulletin
against the LAPA's definition of a "rule," using the factual
situations in both Liberty Mutual and Gingles as jurisprudential
guidelines. Persons regulated by the agency would thus be able to
place greater reliance on any bulletins that an agency promulgated;
with clearer jurisprudential direction, an agency would be less
likely to issue a bulletin that would later be struck down by a court
because it had not gone through notice and comment.
129. Liberty Mut., 696 So. 2d at 1026.
130. See La. Bulletin LIRC 98-01 (1998) ("The prescribed UM form is
required by law to be used with all automobile insurance policies delivered or
issued for delivery in Louisiana."); La. Bulletin LIRC 98-03 (1998) ("[A]ll UM
selection/rejections must be executed on the UM form.").
131. Liberty Mut., 696 So. 2d at 1026.
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IV. SHOULD NOTICE AND COMMENT BE REQUIRED FOR THESE
DOCUMENTS?
An analysis of LAPA's "rule" definition, along with the related
jurisprudence, suggests that it is very likely that the documents at
issue in Gingles are rules subject to notice and comment. The
question then becomes whether such documents should be required
to go through notice and comment. The Gingles documents had a
substantial effect on the rights of both insurers and insureds due to
the potentially major consequences of having or not having UM
coverage. However, agencies issue many other documents that
have far less of an effect on the substantive rights of affected
persons than did the Gingles documents.132 There are policy
considerations both for and against requiring notice and comment
for these documents, and several possible exceptions exist under
current Louisiana law that may allow the documents to evade
notice and comment in limited circumstances.
A. Policy Considerations
Regardless of whether a legal analysis suggests that a form
authorized by statute for agency promulgation should go through
the LAPA's notice-and-comment procedures, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has some strong policy justifications for not
recognizing such a requirement in the foreseeable future. The UM
statute is only one of numerous Louisiana statutes that direct an
agency to prescribe a form or similar document.1 33 Furthermore,
even when not specifically directed by statute, agencies issue
countless forms for a variety of purposes, and most of those forms
do not affect substantive rights to the degree of the UM waiver
form.' 3 4 If the Louisiana Supreme Court were to suddenly
announce that all such forms lacked legal effect because they had
not been promulgated via the LAPA's notice-and-comment
procedures, then many aspects of state government could grind to a
screeching halt. Even if such a ruling were to apply prospectively
only, the resulting time delay in promulgation of the forms as a
result of the notice-and-comment process,'35 as well as the
132. See supra note 105.
133. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:211(B) (2005) (Commissioner of
Financial Institutions authorized to prescribe a form for the incorporation and
operation of state banks); id. § 18:18(A)(3) (Supp. 2011) (Secretary of State
directed to prescribe a form for voter registration applications).
134. See supra note 105.
135. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (summarizing the notice-
and-comment process).
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associated administrative costs in both funds and manpower,136
would significantly decrease the overall efficiency of state
administrative agencies.
Similar issues arise regarding the instructional bulletins
accompanying these forms. If the forms should be exempt from
notice and comment for policy reasons, then the bulletins
providing clarification and instruction regarding the forms should
also be exempt. The argument for an exemption from notice and
comment for a particular bulletin is weakened, though, when the
bulletin imposes additional substantive requirements not present or
clearly apparent in the form itself, as with the bulletins in Gingles.
Lack of notice and comment in that case would allow agencies to
promulgate such bulletins without any prior input from the persons
whom the bulletins would affect, to those persons' potential
detriment. Nevertheless, most agency bulletins do not include these
substantive elements and would therefore seem to be prime
candidates for a notice-and-comment exemption.
Although there may be legitimate policy arguments for not
requiring notice and comment for some agency forms and
bulletins, at the same time agencies should not be allowed to
ignore the LAPA's mandated notice-and-comment procedures
whenever those procedures would be burdensome to the agencr
Notice-and-comment procedures, whether found in the LAPA,lyl
the federal APA,' 3 8 or other state administrative procedure acts, 139
allow interested parties, prior to an agency's enactment of
proposed rules that would affect those parties, to submit
meaningful comments-in effect, allowing their voices to be heard
in the rulemaking process. 140 Although ignoring notice and
comment for seemingly trivial matters like agency forms and
bulletins may not at first appear to be a serious problem, such
behavior by agencies could eventually lead to more egregious
136. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind
the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1379 (1992) ("Legislative rulemaking
procedures can levy upon limited agency funds, people, and other resources.");
Asimow, supra note 32, at 404 ("To produce any new rule ... an agency must
incur the substantial bureaucratic costs of overcoming inertia. . . . The financial
and psychological costs of forging consensus within an agency on the contents
of a new rule may be quite substantial.").
137. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:953(A) (Supp. 2011).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
139. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11346-11348 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011);
N.Y. A.P.A. § 202 (McKinney Supp. 2011); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§
2001.021-.041 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
140. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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violations of the LAPA's rulemaking provisions.141 And as the
Gingles case aptly illustrates, even an apparently innocuous rule
can turn out to have major consequences. Consequently, allowing
such rules to "slip through the cracks" of notice and comment
could result in potential detriment to the public, without the public
having a prior opportunity for input.
B. Possible Solutions Under Existing Louisiana Law
There may be legitimate policy justifications for not forcing
some agency forms and bulletins to go through the LAPA's
required notice-and-comment procedures, but there are also
legitimate policy reasons for not allowing agencies to flout those
requirements. The question then becomes whether either the LAPA
or another area of Louisiana law provides a mechanism by which
forms and documents with a minimal effect on substantive rights
could evade notice and comment without violating the LAPA's
express provisions. The LAPA itself provides two possibly
applicable exceptions to the normal notice-and-comment
requirements, and a line of cases from one of the state appellate
courts suggests a third possibility.
1. "Emergency Rule" Exception
The LAPA's rulemaking provisions allow for temporary
"emergency rules" that can circumvent the normally prescribed
notice-and-comment procedures.142 An agency can only
promulgate these "emergency rules" when it finds that such a rule
is necessary due to "an imminent peril to the public health, safety,
or welfare," or in certain other limited circumstances.143 An
emergency rule goes into effect as soon as it is promulgated, with
no requirement for prior notice and comment, and the rule can be
invalidated within 60 days of its promulgation by the governor or
141. Such violations could include, for example, an agency ignoring notice
and comment for broad statements of policy or for comprehensive rules
affecting large classes of persons. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. La. Ins. Rating
Comm'n, 696 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1997) (noting that "many
state agencies routinely ignore these provisions of law"); Michael Asimow,
California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 55-62 (1992)
(noting that California agencies routinely evade notice-and-comment
requirements through various methods).
142. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:953(B) (Supp. 2011).
143. Id. The other circumstances where emergency rules may be promulgated
include when they are necessary to avoid sanctions or penalties from the United
States, to avoid a budget deficit for medical assistance programs, or to secure
new or enhanced federal funding for medical assistance programs. Id.
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by an oversight subcommittee of the state legislature.'4
Emergency rules are designed to take effect quickly and to "fill ...
gap[s]" during a time of need before an agency can enact a
permanent rule throgh the normally prescribed notice-and-
comment procedures.
Louisiana case law regarding the precise meaning of "an
imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare" is not
extensive, but two Louisiana First Circuit cases are instructive on
the matter. In Cressey v. Foster, the state Department of Social
Services promulgated an emergency rule that provided for
distribution of child support collections in response to a change in
federal legislation that had left the state without a legislative
framework for such distribution.14 6 The court held that the undue
financial hardship that welfare recipients would have suffered if
the emergency rule had not been disseminated constituted "an
imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare" that
justified the rule's promulgation.14 7 By contrast, in Premier
Games, Inc. v. State, the state Department of Public Safety and
Corrections issued emergency rules to provide for the non-prorated
collection of video gaming device operation fees. 14 8 A Department
declaration stated that emergency rulemaking was necessary to
ensure the collection of video gaming revenues and to regulate the
industry for the purposes of maintaining public confidence and
"protecting the health, welfare and safety of the public." 49
Dismissing the Department's argument that the declaration of
emergency met the LAPA's requirements for an emergency rule,
the court remarked that such a declaration requires "more than a
conclusory statement, but contemplates a description of the facts
and circumstances which justify the conclusion that imminent peril
exists."1 50 The court thereby held that the rule was not an
emergency rule and was thus invalid because it had not been
promulgated via notice and comment. 5 1
The emergency rule exception might seem enticing to an
agency that wants to circumvent notice and comment for its
documents, but in most cases it is unlikely that those documents
will comport with the exception's fairly stringent requirements.
144. Id; see Ketchum & Olsan, supra note 17, at 1352-53.
145. Premier Games, Inc. v. State, 761 So. 2d 707, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2000).
146. 694 So. 2d 1016 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1997).
147. Id. at 1024.
148. 761 So. 2d 707.
149. Id. at 711.




Using the documents at issue in Gingles as examples, the LDOI
would be hard-pressed to argue that promulgation of a UM waiver
form or its accompanying bulletin without notice and comment
would somehow negate "an imminent peril to the public health,
safety, or welfare."" The exception would be even harder to apply
to more mundane agency documents that have less of an effect on
substantive rights than do the Gingles documents. Overall,
imagining a situation where an agency would be able to utilize the
emergency rule exception to evade notice and comment for the
promulgation of a document would be difficult. Perhaps the only
situation where this might work would be if a defect is discovered
in a pre-existing document, and the defect is so detrimental to the
public that an immediate publication of an amended document
without notice and comment is necessary to protect the public from
significant harm.
2. "Internal Agency Management" Exception
Although it is unlikely in most cases that agency documents
can meet the requirements of the LAPA's emergency rule
exception to notice and comment, that exception is not the only
method under the LAPA by which to bypass notice and comment.
The LAPA also provides that agency statements, guides, or
requirements for conduct or action that would otherwise fall under
the LAPA's definition of a "rule" are exempt from that definition
(and thus from notice and comment) when they "regulat[e] only
the internal management of the agency."' 5 3 Louisiana cases
interpreting this provision have mainly applied it in the context of
university regulations. In Mix v. University ofNew Orleans, an ex-
employee of the University of New Orleans claimed that the
university did not follow its own grievance procedures when firing
him and that those procedures were administrative "rules" binding
on the university. 54 The court found that those grievance
procedures regulated only the internal management of the
university and were consequently not legally binding rules.'5 5
Similarly, in Jones v. Southern University & A&M College System,
a nontenured law professor fired by Southern University claimed
152. Regarding UM waivers in particular, one could argue that the public
health, safety, and welfare might actually be enhanced by the lack of a valid
method for insured persons to waive UM coverage, due to Louisiana's strong
public policy favoring UM coverage. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying
text.
153. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (Supp. 2011).
154. 609 So. 2d 958 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992).
155. Id. at 960.
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that the university had violated its own tenure procedures and that
those procedures were administrative rules binding on the
university.156 The court, employing reasoning very similar to that
used by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit in Mix, held that the
university's tenure procedures pertained only to the internal
management of the universitY57 and, therefore, were not legally
binding rules under the LAPA.
The Louisiana jurisprudence offers little guidance as to the
exact boundaries of the "internal agency management" exception
beyond the university context. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that
the exception would probably not apply to documents, such as
those at issue in Gingles, that affect the substantive rights of
persons outside the agency. Using the Gingles documents as
examples, it would be hard to say that when a form comprises the
sole method by which one can waive UM coverage, then that form
regulates only the internal management of the agency. The same
reasoning applies to bulletins that impose an additional
requirement for a valid UM waiver. It is certainly possible,
however, that some documents that do not affect the substantive
rights of others could fall into this exception. A public bulletin
announcing a change in an agency's daily hours of operation, for
example, would likely escape notice and comment under this
exception because the bulletin only involves the internal
management of the agency and does not affect the substantive
rights of persons that the agency regulates. Many agency
documents with little or no effect on the substantive rights of
regulated persons could potentially fall under this exception,
allowing the documents to lawfully evade notice and comment and
thereby increasing administrative efficiency. However, a Louisiana
court has yet to interpret the internal agency management
exception in this manner, thus leaving these myriad "mundane"
documents at risk of a challenge to their legality.
3. Implied Agency Powers?
Assuming that none of the LAPA's existing exceptions to notice
and comment apply to agency documents that fall under the LAPA's
definition of a "rule," there may yet be another method by which
these documents could lawfully evade notice and comment. The
Louisiana First Circuit initially recognized the existence of an
"implied agency powers" doctrine in Realty Mart, Inc. v. Louisiana
156. 693 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1997).
157. Id. at 1268.
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Board of Tax Appeals.'s That case addressed whether the Louisiana
Board of Tax Appeals had the power to compel a party to answer
written interrogatories propounded by another party.'" The court
noted that "[a]n administrative board or agency only has the power
and authority expressly granted by the constitution or statutes.
Nevertheless, some power and authority may be implied as
necessary or appropriate in order to effectuate the express powers
granted to, or imposed upon, such board or agency." 60 However,
because the Board had not been granted any express power that
could have given rise to the implied powers alleged, the court found
that the implied agency powers doctrine did not apply.'61
Since the Realty Mart decision, several other Louisiana First
Circuit cases have acknowledged the implied agency powers
doctrine while simultaneously finding the doctrine inapplicable to
the facts before the court.162 Thus far, only one case has utilized the
doctrine to validate an agency action that may not have otherwise
been allowed. In Devillier v. State, the Division of Charitable
Gaming Control initiated disciplinary proceedings against a number
of persons who had allegedly violated state gaming law while
conducting a charitable bingo operation.163 In an administrative
hearing, the administrative law judge deemed the parties unsuitable
for involvement in charitable gaming in any capacity. 6 4 On appeal,
the affected parties argued that the Division had exceeded its
statutory authority because the only allowable penalties under the
governing statute were fines, suspensions of licenses, and
revocations of licenses.' 6 5 The court, after invoking the implied
agency powers doctrine, recited the governing statute's declaration
of purpose, which stated that the policy of the state of Louisiana is
to decrease the potential for fraud in charitable games of chance.166
The court thereby held, in light of that public policy, that the
agency's actions were "necessary and appropriate" to effectuate the
agency's statutory mandate and to carry out its policies and were,
therefore, a proper exercise of agency authority.'
158. 336 So. 2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1976).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. See In re Arnold, 991 So. 2d 531 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2008); RMI v.
Southdown Care Ctr., 747 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1999); Hawkins v. State,
613 So. 2d 229 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1992).
163. 634 So. 2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1993).
164. Id. at 886.





The first circuit is the only Louisiana court to have expressly
recognized the existence of implied agency powers. However, it is
possible that the Louisiana Supreme Court implicitly recognized
the existence of such powers in Duncan, where the court-while
holding that a valid UM waiver required more than just the few
requirements delineated in the UM statute-remarked that "[i]n
directing the [C]ommissioner of [I]nsurance to prescribe a form,
the legislature gave the [C]ommissioner the authority to determine
what the form would require."l 68 One might argue that the
Louisiana Supreme Court, through the aforementioned phrase in
Duncan, was thereby recognizing the existence of implied agency
powers in Louisiana. Then again, it is also possible that the court
was merely acknowledging the well-known "Chevron doctrine" of
federal administrative law where, in the absence of legislative
guidance, an agency interpretation of a governing statute is entitled
to deference by a reviewing court.'6 9 Despite the attractiveness of
the idea that the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the
existence of implied agency powers in Louisiana, it is more likely
that the court, in that single phrase in Duncan, was simply restating
a pre-existing legal principle rather than introducing an entirely
new dimension to Louisiana administrative law.
However, if the Duncan court did, in fact, recognize the
existence of implied agency powers in Louisiana, then an agency
seeking to exempt its documents from notice and comment could
theoretically attempt to utilize the implied agency powers doctrine
for that purpose. In the LDOI's case, the agency could argue that
requiring it to promulgate its UM waiver form via notice and
comment would lead to absurd results due to the costs in time and
resources associated with the process.1 70 Therefore, the LDOI
168. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 950 So. 2d 544, 552 (La. 2006); see supra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
169. The United States Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), held that when Congress
implicitly delegates power to an agency regarding a specific issue, "a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844. Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not expressly recognized the Chevron doctrine as a
matter of Louisiana law, the Louisiana First Circuit appears to have done so. See
State v. La. State Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Div., 694 So. 2d 316, 324 (La.
Ct. App. 1st 1996) ("The reviewing court should determine if the agency's
construction and interpretation of the statute is a permissible reading of it; not the
only permissible reading of it." (emphasis added)); In re Recovery I, Inc., 635 So.
2d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1994) ("Considerable weight should be afforded to
an administrative agency's construction of a statutory scheme that it is entrusted to
administer and deference must be awarded to its administrative interpretations.").
170. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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would argue, the agency must have implied power to prescribe the
form without using notice and comment because such power
would be "necessary and appropriate" to fulfill the statutory
mandate imposed upon the agency by the legislature through the
UM statute. Similar arguments could be made for the promulgation
of other such documents, where the time and resources consumed
by the notice-and-comment process would, in the agency's view,
drastically outweigh any potential benefits to be gained from
public input.' 7 1
Then again, even if implied agency powers do exist in
Louisiana, the LAPA's express statutory provisions regarding
rulemaking may override any implied powers that an agency might
have. If an agency document was found to meet the LAPA's
definition of a rule, then the LAPA's notice-and-comment
requirements should apply to that document, notwithstanding any
utility that an agency could gain by evading notice and comment
via the implied agency powers doctrine. Thus, although implied
agency powers might allow an agency to engage in numerous
activities not directly permitted by statute, the agency would
nevertheless likely need an express statutory exception in order to
exempt its documents from notice and comment.
C. Suggestion for Change
Despite the recognition of the implied agency powers doctrine
by at least one Louisiana court,172 the use of the doctrine to exempt
"mundane" agency documents from notice and comment remains
theoretical at best and wildly speculative at worst. If no other
method can be found under Louisiana law by which such
documents can evade notice and comment, then agencies will be
faced with the difficult choice of either putting all of their forms
and related documents through lengthy notice-and-comment
procedures or continuing to disregard the LAPA's rulemaking
provisions. To avoid such a situation, the Louisiana Legislature
should amend the LAPA to provide for an exception to notice and
comment for agency documents that have a minimal effect on the
substantive rights of affected persons. Such a change could be
adapted from existing approaches in federal law or the law of other
states, or the legislature could adopt its own novel approach.
171. See supra note 105.
172. It is worth noting that the court that recognizes the doctrine, the
Louisiana First Circuit, is also the circuit court where cases dealing with state
administrative law are most often brought.
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One effective method would be to provide an exception to
notice and comment for documents that an agency designates as
"routine" or "mundane."'7 Such documents would be conferred
legally binding effect immediately, without going through any pre-
adoption procedures, but would be subject to an expedited form of
post-adoption notice and comment for a specified period of time,
such as six months or one year. This post-adoption notice-and-
comment procedure could be implemented simply by making each
document available for public viewing on the agency's website and
allowing the public to submit comments via the website itself;
alternatively, each agency's documents could be uploaded to a
single, state-administered website for increased efficiency.' 74 At
the end of the specified time period, the agency would be required
to re-promulgate the document in final form after addressing any
suggestions or concerns raised by the public during the notice-and-
comment period. An agency's publication of a document without
notice and comment would be subject to legislative or executive
oversight; this would ensure that documents, such as those in
Gingles, that have an inordinately large impact on substantive
rights could be summarily invalidated before the end of the notice-
and-comment period if the documents' effects became
unacceptably detrimental.
This post-adoption notice-and-comment approach would strike
a balance between the competing needs of administrative
efficiency in state government and protection of the substantive
rights of affected persons. An agency would be able to issue most
of its documents immediately, without the delay inherent in notice-
and-comment procedures, and the post-adoption notice-and-
comment period would give the public the opportunity to shed
light on any potential problems with the document. The
requirement of mandatory re-promulgation of the document would
ensure that any problems identified during the notice-and-comment
period would be quickly remedied, and the legislative or executive
oversight would guarantee that any significant problems caused by
a defective document would be dealt with expeditiously. Agencies
173. This proposal is heavily influenced by Michael Asimow, Guidance
Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 631 (2002).
Professor Asimow proposes a similar exception to pre-adoption notice-and-
comment procedures for agency guidance documents, which are documents
expressing an agency's view about the meaning of language in statutes or
regulations or explaining how staff or agency adjudicators should exercise their
discretionary or enforcement powers. Id. at 632, 655-57.
174. This proposal assumes that most interested parties would have some sort




and the public would collectively benefit from the increased
administrative efficiency resulting from the general exception, and
the public would be sufficiently protected by the various
safeguards built into the exception.
If the above regulatory scheme had been in effect at the time
the Commissioner promulgated the UM waiver form, then the
series of disputes that culminated in the Gingles decision could
very well have been avoided. Assuming that the LIRC would have
regarded the waiver form as a "mundane" document, then upon
publication of the form, the LIRC would have simultaneously
made the form available for public viewing. An interested observer
could have quickly noticed the discrepancy between the waiver
form itself, which included no blank for the insurer's company
name, and the form's accompanying bulletin, which required the
inclusion of the company name on the form. Any observer who
noticed the problem could then have submitted comments via the
website, thus bringing the problem to the attention of the LIRC and
enabling the agency to swiftly re-publish the documents in order to
rectify the discrepancy between the form and the bulletin. Public
display of the documents would also have allowed an interested
party to challenge the documents as being "rules" under the LAPA;
this would have allowed the question of the documents' legal
status to be resolved in the courts relatively early, decreasing the
risk that a court would invalidate the waiver form for not going
through notice and comment only after a significant number of
persons had already relied on the form. An early resolution of these
various disputes, enabled by the expedited post-adoption notice-
and-comment procedures, could have reduced both legal
uncertainty and the dockets of Louisiana courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Gingles documents can escape
being classified as rules subject to notice and comment under the
LAPA. This result is probably best, due to the significant real-
world consequences of a valid or invalid UM waiver. If the
bulletins in particular had been accorded legally binding effect-
despite the lack of prior notice and comment-then any person
desiring to waive UM coverage, but who failed to learn of the
bulletin's company name requirement, would end up executing an
ineffectual waiver. The person executing the invalid waiver would
then have unintended UM coverage. While on one level this result
might be preferable to the state, considering Louisiana's strong
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public policy in favor of UM coverage,' 7 5 it also goes against the
intent of the insured (who desired the UM waiver) and forces the
insurance company to provide coverage for which the insured has
not paid. Such a result could establish an unfavorable precedent in
Louisiana where agreements desired by both parties are
subsequently invalidated due to minor formal deficiencies that may
have been difficult to foresee.
At the same time, there are innumerable other documents
issued by Louisiana agencies, and most of these documents do not
carry nearly as heavy consequences for minor omissions or other
mistakes as does the UM waiver form.'7  Requiring notice and
comment for each of these documents prior to according them
legally binding effect would impose an onerous burden in time and
resources on the agencies. 77 This burden could potentially drive
the agencies to flout the required notice-and-comment procedures
entirely, whether openly or covertly. 17
To avoid this undesirable result, the Louisiana Supreme Court
should either provide a definitive interpretation of the LAPA's
"rule" definition that exempts from notice and comment agency
documents that have a minimal effect on the substantive rights of
affected persons or interpret the existing "internal agency
management" exception so as to provide for such an exemption. If
the court is unable or unwilling to do so, then the Louisiana
Legislature should amend the LAPA to include that exemption.
The amended law could provide safeguards such as post-adoption
notice and comment for documents, like the Gingles bulletins, that
measurably affect substantive rights. But sometimes, an agency's
promulgation of documents really is just a trifling matter, and
Louisiana law should treat it as such.
Michael J. Fagan, Jr.*
175. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 105.
177. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
178. See Asimow, supra note 141, at 55-62 (commenting that California
agencies employ various methods to circumvent burdensome notice-and-comment
requirements); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifring" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) ("[There] is recent evidence
that agencies are beginning to seek out alternative, less participatory regulatory
vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and formalized structures of the
informal rulemaking process.").
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